31 October 2026
Renewed disruption to oil infrastructure in western Libya has brought the connection between security conditions and business continuity into focus. For organisations with personnel, contractors or projects in the country, the immediate priority is to understand whether existing security arrangements and contingency plans remain workable.
On 30 October, Libya’s National Oil Corporation reported that an armed group had closed a valve on the main pipeline connecting the Hamada fields to the Zawiya refinery. The forced closure caused a sharp increase in operating pressure, prompting technical teams to halt pumping to protect the pipeline and production facilities. The corporation warned that a continued closure would interrupt approximately 15,000 barrels per day of crude supplies intended for the refinery.
The incident follows another closure on the Hamada–Zawiya line earlier in October. Although a pipeline interruption does not itself establish that personnel movements or airports are affected, the recurrence highlights the importance of testing the local conditions and dependencies on which operations rely.
Security risk in Libya requires a local operational picture
A country-level assessment provides context. Decisions about a particular assignment require a more detailed understanding of the locations, routes, providers and infrastructure involved. An organisation may have accommodation available, a functioning project site and confirmed flights, while still depending on a vulnerable connection between them. Access arrangements, transport availability and the ability to obtain medical support all need to be considered together.
For energy businesses, engineering contractors and other organisations operating in Libya, a security review should therefore examine the full operating footprint: where personnel live and work, how they move, who supports them and what would happen if one part of that arrangement became unavailable.
Current UK travel advice reflects geographical differences. As checked on 31 October, the FCDO advises against all travel to most of Libya and against all but essential travel to specified locations, including Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. It also warns that UK government support is limited and stresses the need for robust security arrangements and contingency plans. (gov.uk)
Organisations should assess each proposed journey against the applicable government advice, their own risk appetite and the practical support available.
Review the arrangements that keep personnel moving
The operational question is whether people can complete their work and return safely under the conditions that exist at the time. A focused review should establish:
Whether primary and alternative routes have been checked against current local conditions.
Whether transport providers can maintain agreed services and communicate changes promptly.
Whether accommodation and project sites offer suitable arrangements for a temporary restriction on movement.
Whether medical assistance remains accessible if the normal route or provider becomes unavailable.
Who has authority to suspend journeys, change staff rotations or approve relocation.
Alternative arrangements need independent verification. A second provider may depend on the same drivers or vehicles as the first. An alternative route may pass through the same affected area. A different departure airport may require a longer ground journey with additional exposure. Effective travel risk management brings these dependencies into the decision before personnel begin moving.
Business continuity depends on people and access
An interruption to infrastructure can create operational consequences beyond the facility directly affected. Organisations should assess their own exposure rather than assume either that disruption will spread or that it will remain contained.
For an individual business, the relevant dependencies may include fuel deliveries, contractor availability, specialist maintenance, staff rotations or access to a particular site. The continuity plan should identify which activities can continue safely, which can be reduced and which require personnel to be present. This also means distinguishing between the needs of visiting executives, technical specialists, resident employees and local staff. Their responsibilities, travel documentation, support requirements and ability to relocate may differ considerably.
A workable continuity plan identifies the minimum staffing needed, the point at which operations should be reduced and the arrangements for supporting those who remain. It should also address how decisions will be communicated to employees, contractors and families.
Evacuation planning should begin before movement becomes urgent
Evacuation is one possible response to deteriorating conditions. Depending on the circumstances, restricting movement, remaining in suitable accommodation or relocating within the country may offer a more appropriate course of action. Those choices require clear decision thresholds. Relevant indicators could include a verified threat to a site, loss of reliable access, deterioration in local security arrangements or the withdrawal of essential transport or medical support.
Each threshold should connect to an agreed action and a named decision-maker. Plans should specify who is included, how they will be contacted, what documentation they need and which movement options have been assessed. For Libya, any proposed departure arrangement must be checked against current route conditions, permissions, entry requirements and actual transport availability. A route recorded in a contingency document is only useful if it remains viable when required.
Organisations reviewing their evacuation planning and crisis response should also test what happens if departure is delayed: where personnel would stay, how they would be supported and when the decision would be reviewed.
Maintain oversight as conditions change
The latest pipeline disruption provides a timely reason to revisit the assumptions supporting operations in Libya. It does not justify treating every location or activity as equally affected. Leadership needs a clear account of what has changed, which personnel or activities are exposed and what action is required. That depends on reliable local reporting, provider liaison and a direct connection between operational teams and those authorised to make decisions. For organisations with sustained exposure, assigning responsibility for that continuing review is essential. Security assessments, travel procedures, business continuity arrangements and crisis plans should remain connected as the operating environment develops.
Stratum Global Risk brings together security risk management, travel risk oversight and crisis coordination, supported by its bilingual operations centre in Amman, Jordan and international provider network. The focus is practical and helps organisations understand their exposure, maintain oversight of their people and prepare response arrangements that can be implemented when required.